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David Versus Goliath: A Law School 
Debate About Bush v. Gore* 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN, MODERATOR** 
 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
For the first time in America’s history, the Supreme Court has, in 
effect, selected the President of the United States.  The case was 
analogous to a claim that a jury verdict was tainted.  The Court, in this 
instance, knew who would win if the verdict was permitted to stand, and 
who was likely to win if the jury was permitted to continue its 
deliberations.  It was this knowledge that made the decision so sensitive 
and challenged the integrity and the role of the Court so profoundly. 
The Court, as you all know, determined to permit the verdict to stand, 
despite the claims of taint.  The panel will discuss the merits.  What I 
thought I would do in this very brief introduction was demonstrate how 
difficult it is to predict what the Supreme Court will do in any given case. 
Many in the legal community predicted that the Supreme Court would 
not take jurisdiction in this matter, a matter that was so clearly delegated 
to the state and to the state supreme court.  It took jurisdiction. 
Many predicted that the Supreme Court would not enjoin the manual 
recount.  If George Bush continued in his lead, the matter would become 
moot.  It was inconceivable to many that continuing the count could 
constitute irreparable injury, which would be required for injunctive 
relief.  Nonetheless, the Court granted the injunction. 
 
 
 *  The debate entitled “Crossfire: The Supreme Court Decision in Bush v. Gore: 
Principled or Partisan?” was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on 
February 21, 2001. 
 **  U.S. Circuit Judge, Third Circuit Court of Appeals (retired); Distinguished 
Jurist in Residence, University of San Diego School of Law.  
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Many predicted that the Supreme Court would defer to the state 
supreme court, consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents, and with 
its view that the supremacy of state’s rights was paramount in such 
matters.  They did not defer. 
Many predicted that the Court must and would render a unanimous 
decision to maintain the dignity and integrity of the Court and, as you all 
know, the decision was a sharply divided one. 
Many scoffed at the equal protection arguments, suggesting that 
requiring uniformity in tabulating votes would render every election 
invalid.  They argued that no election, past or present, could possibly 
pass the scrutiny that the Supreme Court had enunciated in this case.  
The Court based its decision on equal protection grounds. 
Many predicted that the Court would not rely upon time constraints in 
reaching its decision, since to a large degree the delay had been caused 
by its own injunction.  But it did so in any event. 
The decision of the Court has been widely criticized, and in the words 
of the dissent, the decision risks a self-inflicted wound, a wound that 
may not harm just the Court, but the nation.  Justice Stevens stated in his 
opinion: “Although we may never know with complete certainty the 
identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of 
the loser is perfectly clear.  It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as 
an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”1 
As recently as yesterday, the Supreme Court decision was reviewed 
extensively in the New York Times, and the article pointed out the efforts 
of the Court, even those of the dissent, to convince the public that 
politics played absolutely no role in this decision and that the decision 
was made upon principle and merits.2 
It is for this reason that we decided to have this forum.  Our own 
distinguished Professor Michael Ramsey believes strongly in the 
correctness of the decision, and has already written on the subject.3  So 
respected is he by his colleagues that we could not get a single professor 
to come in here and argue the opposite side.  Two of your classmates, 
two brave souls, stepped forward to take on this Goliath, this expert in 
the field: Erin Alexander and Brian Fogarty.  Professor Ramsey decided 
to enlist Joshua Jessen to participate with him. 
We will hear first from those who are in favor of the decision, Joshua 
Jessen and Professor Ramsey.  Erin Alexander and Brian Fogarty will 
then speak in opposition.   
 
 1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 2. Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at A1. 
 3. Michael D. Ramsey, Blame Gore’s Lawyers for His Defeat, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Dec. 15, 2000, at B9. 
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I.  ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE DECISION 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY:4 
 
It is actually not my intent here to talk about legal doctrine.  The focus 
of my remarks here will be on the legal strategy and perhaps the 
reasonableness, shall we say, of the decision.  The proposition I want to 
advance is that Al Gore’s lawyers chose an ultimately self-defeating 
legal strategy.  They overreached in search of a tactical advantage, 
which ultimately left them in the U.S. Supreme Court arguing the less 
reasonable position. 
It is my observation that the Supreme Court, like courts in general, 
tends to find a way to let the most reasonable party win.  And in Bush v. 
Gore,5 Bush had the more reasonable position, not necessarily because 
Bush was right on the law, but because Gore’s tactical overreaching put 
him in a bad strategic position. 
Now let me explain what I mean by all of this.  First, I will address the 
Gore tactical overreach.  Gore obviously needed a hand recount to overturn 
the machine count that favored Bush.  The question was what kind of a 
hand recount he would seek. 
Gore’s lawyers chose to pursue a selective recount—that is, a recount 
only for heavily Democratic counties.  This was their tactic for the 
simple reason that a hand recount tends to increase the total number of 
votes that are counted.  Now, we assume, or at least I assume, that 
Democratic and Republican voters err in casting their votes at roughly 
the same rate.  So a hand recount will generally enhance the votes of 
each candidate roughly in proportion to the total number of votes that 
they received.  This is why hand recounts rarely overturn the results of 
the machine count. 
But if you count only in Democratic areas, you would expect net 
Democratic gains.  Because there are more Democratic votes counted 
total, there are going to be more Democratic mistakes in those particular 
areas.  This is not because Democrats are making more mistakes, but 
because there are just more Democrats in those counties.  So selective 
 
 4. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  Professor Ramsey 
served as a judicial clerk to Associate Justice Antonin Scalia from 1990 to 1991. 
 5. 531 U.S. 98. 
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recounts seemed like a smart move by Gore.  With a selective recount, 
he seemed headed for a win.  Indeed, that is what seemed to be 
happening in the counties as they counted. 
The problem is that a selective recount is very hard to justify as a 
matter of reasonableness.  It may be justifiable as a matter of law, 
because there are some technical legal justifications for what Gore was 
asking for.  But even if it is legal, it is unreasonable to do a selective 
recount because, when you think about it, it plainly conveys the tactical 
advantage to which I just referred.  Moreover, there is really no decent 
argument for why, in a statewide election, you should only recount the 
heavily Democratic counties. 
Gore’s strategists tried to make some arguments to deal with this 
problem.  They pointed, for example, to the confusing ballot in Palm 
Beach County.  At one point that was said to be the reason for the 
recount, but actually it turned out that it was not the real reason because 
Gore wanted recounts in other counties that did not have confusing 
ballots as long as they were Democratic. 
What Gore was looking for was an enhanced Democratic vote by 
recounting only the Democratic areas.  And in the end, the Florida 
Supreme Court, which in popular lore is the unjustifiably pro-Gore 
court, could not accept the idea of a selective recount, held it illegal, and 
directed a statewide recount.6  The problem was, they did this very late 
in the process, and did it without, in my judgment, thinking it through 
completely.  In particular, they did not specify any sort of standards to 
be used, and ultimately it was on the point of standards that the U.S. 
Supreme Court overturned the Florida Supreme Court.7  But I want to 
make it clear that the two courts agreed that Gore’s five-week strategy of 
pursuing the selective recount was something that could not stand. 
The question was where to go from there.  This is where I think 
Gore’s attempt to gain a tactical advantage ultimately backfired on him.  
At that point—that is, at the time the U.S. Supreme Court was deciding 
what to do—it was five weeks into the process and only a few days 
before the meeting of the Electoral College.  It seemed pretty clear that 
continuing the process would lead to a constitutional nightmare. 
First of all, the recount would take time.  Second of all, the 
Republican-controlled Florida legislature was set to confirm a slate of 
Florida electors voting for the Bush-Cheney ticket.  Florida’s governor 
was going to go along with that.  If any recount held after that point 
showed Gore the winner, the Florida Supreme Court might order a new 
set of electors.  But it was not clear whether the governor and the 
 
 6. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1261–62 (Fla. 2000). 
 7. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106, 109. 
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legislature would go along with the court. 
Moreover, given the tone of the dispute at this point, it is pretty clear 
that the recount would have been challenged in court again by 
whomever lost.  So it seemed very unlikely that the process could ever 
be completed.  Not only would it not be completed by the time the 
electoral college met, it did not look like it would be completed even by 
the time Congress met in January of the following year.  And, moreover, 
Congress itself, which would probably end up deciding this question, 
was divided.  At that point there would have been a Republican House 
and a Democratic Senate, based on the tie-breaking vote in the Senate 
being cast by the Vice President, Al Gore. 
On the whole, things did not look good.  It seemed likely that this 
matter would be coming back to the Supreme Court a number of times, 
and we would be in for a very protracted and difficult process.  I think it 
was reasonable for the Supreme Court to say: “Well, we ought to consider 
just shutting this whole process down.”  At that point the Court is going 
to look and say: “Who is responsible for this mess?”  And the answer is 
Al Gore. 
Why?  Because he and his lawyers had spent the previous five weeks 
pursuing the selective recount, which was of course designed to give him 
a tactical advantage, but without any reasonable justification, other than 
it would cause him to win.  And, of course, every court that considered 
the matter decided that this selective recount was illegal under both 
Florida and U.S. law. 
Having wasted five weeks in an attempt to bend the rules in his favor, 
Gore was in a pretty unsympathetic position.  He was in something like 
the position of somebody who, having attempted to cheat and having 
been caught, then says: “Well, okay, let us do it over and we will do it 
right this time.”  Whatever you think of Al Gore, and I do not mean to be 
overly critical of Gore (it is simply a question of the tactics he selected), 
the tactics made him look bad.  And for that reason the Supreme Court 
did not lose a lot of sleep over saying: “We’re going to shut this process 
down at Gore’s expense.” 
In my view, this was not a foreordained result—that the Supreme 
Court would come out this way.  If Gore’s lawyers had asked for a 
statewide recount with uniform standards from the beginning, they, and 
not Bush, would have had the more reasonable argument.  The Gore side 
would not have appeared to be unfairly pursuing a tactical advantage, 
and they would not have wasted five weeks going after something that 
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ultimately the courts could not uphold. 
If the Bush v. Gore case had arisen, let us say, three or four weeks 
earlier, in the context of a Gore request for a statewide recount with 
uniform standards, and Bush claimed that this manifestly reasonable 
request by Gore was somehow illegal as a technical matter based on a 
close reading of Article II of the Constitution and some federal statutes, I 
think we would have seen a completely different result.  Therefore, I am 
inclined to conclude that this decision was as much driven by legal 
strategy of the parties as anything else. 
Of course, Gore might have lost the statewide recount based on 
uniform standards, and that is why he did not pursue it initially.  But he 
at least would have had a chance, had he reached that result with the 
Supreme Court.  So, my lesson in legal strategy here is that by trying for 
a certain win, Gore’s lawyers ultimately assured their defeat.  In sum, I 
say to lawyers: “Do not overreach, because the legal system will find a 
way to punish overreachers.” 
I am not sure in the context of this discussion whether that means I 
think that the Bush v. Gore decision was “principled” or “partisan.”  But 
what I do think about it is that it was driven by which side appeared the 
most sympathetic—which side appeared to be the most reasonable.  And 
I think that Gore and his legal team backed themselves into a corner, in 
which they ultimately appeared in front of the Supreme Court to be less 
reasonable in asking for an indefinite extension of a confusing and 
messy process, well beyond the deadlines that seemed to matter, because 
they spent the previous five weeks trying to get an unfair and 
unjustifiable tactical advantage. 
I leave it to my colleague to talk a little more about the legal justification 
of the case.  But let me say in conclusion that, when the Court finds one 
side reasonable and one side unreasonable as a practical matter, and each 
side has technical arguments which seem legally justified, the Court is 
likely to come out on the reasonable side.   
JOSHUA JESSEN:8 
There is no question that the Gore strategy was to manipulate the 
process, and ultimately that strategy played a role in his downfall.  My 
assignment, however, is to present a legal defense of the Court’s decision.  
Toward that end, I will attempt to explain the per curiam opinion, and to a 
lesser extent Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion. 
 
 
 8. J.D. Candidate 2002, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 1996, 
University of Pennsylvania. 
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The first thing I would like to note is that there were seven Justices in 
this case who found equal protection difficulites with the recount ordered by 
the Florida Supreme Court, and that is the ground on which the Court 
ultimately reversed the Florida Supreme Court.  It is not, of course, the 
case that seven Justices voted to reverse, but it is important to bear in 
mind that, in addition to the majority, Justices Souter and Breyer found 
equal protection problems.9  Their disagreement was with respect to the 
remedy.10 
The Court in its per curiam opinion stated that (probably unbeknownst 
to most citizens) individual voters do not have a constitutional right to 
elect the President.  That right, rather, is constitutionally delegated to state 
legislatures.  It is only through a state legislature’s provision for an 
election that we as voters are able to vote for electors for the President. 
However, the Court noted that once this right to vote is given to the 
individual voter, it rises to the level of a fundamental right.11  And 
certainly there have been prior cases in which the Court has held that the 
requirements of equal protection apply to the right to vote.12  In fact, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that potential infringements on the right 
to vote must be closely scrutinized.13  However, even if we view the 
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion through the lens of minimum scrutiny, 
the Florida court’s decision does not pass equal protection muster.   
What exactly did the Florida Supreme Court do?  The court reversed 
the circuit court during the contest period, ordering a recount of the 
undervotes.  In so doing, the only standard the Florida court set forth for 
judging a vote was the “intent of the voter.”14  This was, in fact, the 
standard the legislature had promulgated.15 
The problem, as the U.S. Supreme Court found, is that while the 
“intent of the voter” standard is a good principle in general, significant 
 
 9. See id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting), 145–46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 10. See id. at 134–35 (Souter, J., dissenting), 146–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 11. Id. at 104. 
 12. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (“[O]nce 
the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”), cited in Bush, 531 
U.S. at 105. 
 13. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“Especially since the 
right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other 
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote 
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”). 
 14. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d. 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000). 
 15. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West 1982 & Supp. 2001). 
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problems arise when one tries to implement it.16  Indeed, observers of 
the initial manual recounts witnessed the chaos that flowed from the 
attempt to implement ambiguous standards.  Standards varied from 
county to county, and as David Boies admitted at oral argument, from 
table to table and from counting team to counting team within the same 
county.17  This was a problem. 
Some in the dissent noted that there are certain circumstances in which 
local communities are allowed to use different standards without such 
use rising to the level of an equal protection violation.18  For example, 
different juries in different counties may attempt to determine the criminal 
intent of defendants without the help of a concrete standard to ensure 
uniformity.  Therefore, at least Justices Stevens and Ginsburg did not 
think that the Florida scheme posed an equal protection problem.19 
But as Professor Larry Alexander has noted, discerning a defendant’s 
intent in a criminal trial is significantly different from discerning a 
voter’s intent by reviewing a ballot.20  In a criminal trial, numerous 
factors are at play, and a jury is attempting to determine the subjective 
intent of the defendant.  However, a ballot is an inanimate object.  Thus, 
it is entirely practical to develop uniform standards for discerning intent 
that can be applied to various ballots access the state.  Florida failed to 
enforce any uniform standards. 
Some would argue—indeed, some in the dissent pointed this out—that 
if such a failure constitutes a violation of equal protection, then the mere 
existence of different types of voting machines in different counties is 
also a violation of equal protection.21  However, Justice Souter noted that 
a legitimate governmental objective exists in allowing counties to have 
local control over the types of machines they use.22  He focused on 
issues such as cost and innovation.23  However, in the present case, there 
was simply no legitimate state interest in having counties apply different 
 
 16. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106–07. 
 17. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *50, Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), 2000 WL 1804429 [hereinafter Transcript of Bush v. Gore 
Oral Argument]. 
 18. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Equal 
Protection Clause does not forbid the use of a variety of voting mechanisms within a 
jurisdiction, even though different mechanisms will have different levels of effectiveness 
in recording voters’ intentions; local variety can be justified by concerns about cost, the 
potential value of innovation, and so on”). 
 19. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 20. See Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, the Florida Vote, and Equal 
Protection, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2001). 
 21. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 22. See id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. 
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standards.  And I think the position that the Court, in fact seven Justices, 
took on that point was entirely legitimate.  As Justice Souter said: “I can 
conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments 
of the expressions of voters’ fundamental rights.  The differences appear 
wholly arbitrary.”24 
 Of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas 
found that additional grounds existed on which to overturn the opinion 
of the Florida Supreme Court.25  The Chief Justice noted that traditionally 
the Supreme Court defers to state court interpretations of state law.26  
However, Rehnquist relied upon Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which is one area of the Constitution in which power is not 
delegated to a state as a whole but is delegated to a specific body within 
a state—in this case, the legislature.27  The Chief Justice read that 
provision as meaning that the Florida Supreme Court owed an additional 
degree of deference to the legislature in “interpreting” its law.28 
Informing Rehnquist’s understanding of Article II, Section 1, was 
Title 3, Section 5 of the U.S. Code, the so-called Safe Harbor provision.  
Essentially, the Safe Harbor provision is a federal law which states that 
presidential electors from a given state cannot be challenged by members of 
Congress as long as the state has complied with certain requirements.  
First, a state must have a standard way of selecting its electors before 
election day.  Second, the electors must be certified no later than six days 
before the Electoral College meets.29 
Chief Justice Rehquist determined that it was the intent of the Florida 
legislature to take advantage of the safe harbor provision.30  A failure to 
do so would mean that Florida’s slate of electors could be challenged in 
Congress.  Placing the state’s electors in jeopardy was clearly not the 
intent of the Florida legislature.  In fact, as the per curiam opinion noted: 
“The Supreme Court of Florida [had] said that the legislature intended 
the State’s electors to ‘participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,’ 
as provided in 3 U.S.C. §5.”31 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 111–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 112, 114. 
 27. Id. at 112–13. 
 28. Id. at 114. 
 29. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 30. Bush, 531 U.S. at 113, 120–21. 
 31. Id. at 110 (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 
1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000)) (second alteration in original). 
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However, the first decision of the Florida Supreme Court extended by 
several days the deadline for requesting manual recounts and completing 
such recounts.32  The concurrence noted that this and other changes the 
Florida Supreme Court had enacted under the guise of interpretation 
exceeded what the court was allowed to do.33  That is to say, these were 
not judicial acts in which the Florida Supreme Court was engaging.  The 
court was going beyond the scope of interpreting law.  Consequently, the 
concurrence essentially said: “Look, although it is rare, there have been 
cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has stepped in and disregarded a 
state court’s interpretation of its own law.”34 
This raises important questions about what a court, in this case a state 
court, may do under the guise of interpretation.  Certainly, there are 
limits to a court’s interpretive abilities.  This becomes evident by asking 
the question: “What may the Florida Supreme Court not do?”  What is 
the Florida Supreme Court constrained from doing?  Is the court allowed 
to employ a standard where, if the intent of the voter is questionable, the 
vote is for Gore, and then say, “We’re just interpreting the statute”?  
There are limits on what the court can do, and it is perfectly proper for 
the United States Supreme Court, especially in light of Article II which 
gives this power to the legislature, to take a look at the state court’s 
interpretations.  Rehnquist’s concurrence, however, is not binding. 
Finally, I would like to focus on the remedy in this case.  Because even 
though seven Justices found equal protection difficulties, only five of them 
voted to enjoin the recount.  The legal rationale was that the Florida 
legislature intended to take advantage of the Safe Harbor provision.  Based 
upon that intent, the Supreme Court decided to shut down the process.35 
This is perhaps the hardest part of the opinion to justify.  In my view, 
however, the Court was acting pragmatically.  The situation in Florida 
was an absolute mess, and the notion that any concrete standards would 
emerge from the Florida Supreme Court’s command to discern the 
“intent of the voter” was wishful thinking.  Additional (and likely 
protracted) litigation would have inevitably arisen over what the 
standards should be.  Justice Stevens believed this would not have posed 
a problem since a magistrate would apparently have settled any disputes 
involving individual ballots.36 
However, this notion—the idea of a magistrate sorting through 
thousands and thousands of disputed ballots, and getting this done by 
 
 32. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 
2000). 
 33. Bush, 531 U.S. at 116–20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 34. See id. at 114–15. 
 35. Id. at 110–11. 
 36. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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December 18th, when the Electoral College was scheduled to meet, or 
even January 6th or 7th, when the electoral votes were to be counted—
was completely impractical.  This was not going to happen. 
The Court, through its remedy, arguably saved us from a constitutional 
crisis.  As Professor Ramsey noted, even if the votes were recounted and 
Florida was able to comply with the minimum requirements of equal 
protection, the Florida legislature was going through the process of 
selecting its own slate of electors.  Thus, even if Gore had somehow 
managed to win the recount, it was likely that there would have been 
competing slates of electors from Florida.  Congress was divided 
between Democrats and Republicans, and the threat of a constitutional 
crisis loomed large.  Consequently, the Court, very pragmatically, very 
practically—in contrast to the dissenters who said, “Well, let’s just let 
them go at it and see what happens”—reversed the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision and ended the process.  I think the remedy is defensible 
on these grounds. 
II.  ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE DECISION 
ERIN ALEXANDER:37 
Brian Fogarty and I have a slightly different take on this opinion than 
Joshua Jessen and Professor Ramsey.  We believe that the argument is 
flawed for several reasons; primarily, the majority’s failure to allow the 
Florida Court to determine a matter of Florida law, and its reliance on 
equal protection as a means of overturning the decision.  I will be 
discussing some of the separation of powers issues embodied in this 
opinion, and Brian will be tackling the equal protection grounds. 
First of all, there is one thing that I have to clear up right away.  
Joshua, and most of the media, characterized this decision as a seven-
two split.  However, this is simply not the case.  In fact, the court was 
sharply divided five to four, with four separate dissenting opinions.38  
The issue that was before the Court was: will the manual recount 
continue or will it stop?39  Although Justice Stevens and Justice Souter 
 
 37. J.D. 2001, University of San Diego School of Law; B.S. 1997, University of 
California, Santa Barbara. 
 38. Id. at 123, 129, 135, 144. 
 39. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads (Ronald Reagan Foundation-sponsored 
debate between Erwin Chemerinsky and Douglas Kmiec, Jan. 30, 2001) (on file with 
Ronald Reagan Foundation) [hereinafter Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads]. 
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did see a potential equal protection problem, their remedy was different 
from that of the five Justice majority; instead of stopping the recount, 
they believed that the Florida Supreme Court should have resolved this 
issue.  I know this because Stevens and Souter could have concurred in 
part and dissented in part, and they chose not to.  Instead they wrote 
dissenting opinions making this case a five-four decision.40 
This case is more about Florida law than about the United States 
constitutional law.41  In its decision, the first thing that the Supreme 
Court stated was that the right to vote is fundamental.42  Florida law is 
clear on this point; every effort must be made to count every vote.43  The 
Bush camp continuously stated: “don’t change the rules after the vote.”  
That was their mantra throughout this entire debate.44  However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision did change the rules.  Instead of deferring to 
Florida law, the Court took matters into its own hands and changed the 
rules by stopping the recount. 
Florida law states that a losing candidate can ask for a contest if the 
candidate can show enough votes to call the election into question.  That 
occurred here.  Florida law also states that a court can create an 
appropriate remedy, which is what the Florida Supreme Court did.45  
That was the law before December 11th.46 And in fact, no new rules 
were made after the vote until the United States Supreme Court issued 
their opinion on December 12th.  Professor Ramsey noted that it was 
important for the United States Supreme Court to get this counting done 
by the December 12th deadline.47  That deadline is embodied in title 3, 
section 5 of the United States Code.  In fact, title 3 is actually a safe 
harbor.  If states turn in their votes by the safe harbor deadline they will 
be insulated from challenges in Congress.48  This is a permissive 
provision and is not mandatory. 49 
The United States Supreme Court relied on title 3 to bar any further 
recounts in Florida.50  Any recount seeking to meet the December 12th 
deadline would be constitutionally contested.  The Court did not say that 
federal law requires the counting to be done by December 12th because 
 
 40. Id.; Bush, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 129 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 41. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 42. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104. 
 43. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bush, 531 U.S. at 101 
 47. Ramsey, supra note 3, at B9. 
 48. Bush, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); The Supreme Court’s 
Ruling: Opening a Gavel of Worms, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 30, 33 [hereinafter 
Opening a Gavel of Worms]; Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 49. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 50. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110–11. 
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federal law does not say this.  The Electoral College does not vote until 
December 18th and these votes are not counted until January 6th.  In 
fact, in 1960, Hawaii turned in its votes later than the rest of the states.  
These votes were counted.51 
What the Court did say was that under its interpretation of Florida law, 
Florida law requires that votes must be turned in by the December 12th 
deadline.52  This is an important distinction, because in making it, the 
Court based its holding on Florida law.53  It decided a matter that the 
Court admits is based on state law.  The Court violated one of the most 
fundamental principles of American jurisprudence: state courts get the 
last word on state law.54 
The Florida Supreme Court was aware of title 3 in making its opinion.  
However, the Florida Supreme Court was not aware that the United 
States Supreme Court would issue a stay, thereby making the recount 
impractical and impossible to do.  The right thing for the Supreme Court 
to do, if it believed that Florida law stated that the counting must be 
done by December 12th, would have been to remand this issue back to 
the Florida Supreme Court, because there is some conflict in Florida 
law.55  On the one hand, you have Florida law, which states that every 
vote must be counted.  On the other hand you have the December 12th 
deadline.  If the United States Supreme Court was really so concerned 
with this December 12th deadline and the Florida court’s interpretation 
of Florida law, it should have remanded the issue back to the Florida 
Supreme Court.  It did not do so. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence, relied on Article II to 
warrant a departure from the usual deference given to state courts.56  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas argued that the 
Florida court’s application of Florida law presented a federal question.57  
They did so because Article II authorizes states to appoint electors only 
in such a manner as the legislature may direct.  Based on this provision, 
the concurrence felt that the normal deference given to the state courts 
was not appropriate in this situation.  The concurrence felt that the United 
 
 51. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 52. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110. 
 53. Opening a Gavel of Worms, supra note 48, at 33. 
 54. Id.; Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 55. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 56. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112. 
 57. Id. at 112–13. 
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States Constitution operated as a limitation on the Supreme Court.58 
However, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noticed, this argument is 
flawed for several reasons.59  First of all, the framers of the Constitution 
knew that the judiciary would construe the legislature’s enactments.  In 
light of the constitutional guarantee to states of a Republican form of 
government,60 Article II can hardly be read as an invite to this Court to 
disrupt a state’s republican regime.  In fact the United States Supreme 
Court has previously stated that the Supreme Court acts as an outsider 
lacking the common exposure to local laws.  The United States Supreme 
Court was not in a position to be as familiar with Florida law and Florida 
principles as the Florida State Supreme Court was.  The United States 
Supreme Court majority should have respected the state court’s 
interpretation of state law.  And as Justice Ginsburg further noticed, the 
Supreme Court frequently upholds state law decisions which are 
contrary to what the United States Supreme Court feels is appropriate or 
even correct.61 
However, the majority took off its federalist cap and decided this 
matter.  It decided that the usual deference given to state courts was 
simply not appropriate in this case because they did not agree with the 
outcome.  The irony here is that the five Justices who continuously 
champion state rights are the very Justices who did not do so here.  In 
fact, only one other time in history, not since 1816, has the United States 
Supreme Court overturned a state court’s interpretation of state law.  
That happened in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.62  Admittedly, this is a 
drastic shift from precedent. 
Did the Florida State Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court vote based on law, or the Justices’ own political ideology?  The 
reality is that people are influenced by their personal persuasions.63  And 
this case is no different.  It is not shocking that a predominately 
Democratic Florida court voted for Al Gore, the Democratic candidate.  
It is also not surprising that the predominately Republican bench voted 
for the Republican candidate George Bush.64 
The proof of the political nature of this decision, and evidence of the 
hypocrisy in this decision, is that the majority, the same five Justices 
who continuously champion states’ rights, who continuously defer to 
states courts’ interpretation of state law, did not do so here.  These 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 135–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 60. U.S. CONST.  art. IV, § 4. 
 61. Id. at 136. 
 62. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 63. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 64. Id. 
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Justices changed their minds based on their own political persuasion.65  
As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent: “[I]n this highly politicized 
matter, the appearance of a split decision runs the risk of undermining 
the public’s confidence in the Court itself. . . .  What it does today, the 
court should have left undone.”66 
Even if you personally are not persuaded that the Supreme Court 
voted based on their own political persuasions, the forty-nine million 
people who voted for Gore, the most people ever to vote for a single 
candidate in all of history, do feel that this decision is biased.  And that is a 
problem. 
BRIAN FOGARTY:67 
As Professor Ramsey said, Bush had a better strategy in this case, the 
more reasonable one.  So perhaps Will Ferrell of Saturday Night Live 
was far more enlightened than any of us thought when in a mock debate 
while playing George W. Bush, he boiled George W.’s campaign down 
to one word: “Strategery.”68 
The Equal Protection Clause is what this Court bases its opinion on.69  
The guarantee of equal protection dates back to the Civil War.70  It was 
added to the Constitution after the Civil War to protect African 
Americans from discrimination, especially in the South.71  During the 
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court practically eradicated this 
doctrine from the Constitution with the “separate but equal” doctrine that 
permitted rigidly racist practices.72  However, the Court valiantly 
rescued the equal protection guarantee with the landmark 1954 Brown v. 
Board of Education73 decision that struck down official segregation.74 
“Over the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist has made it [difficult] to win constitutional claims 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bush, 531 U.S. at 157–58. 
 67. J.D. 2001, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 1998, Boston College. 
 68. Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 7, 2000). 
 69. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109. 
 70. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 84–95 (1976). 
 71. Id. 
 72. David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, High Court in Tight Spot over Ruling, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2000, at A1. 
 73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 74. Id. at 487–91; see also Savage & Weinstein, supra note 72, at A4. 
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of unequal treatment.”75  “To succeed, the court has ruled, claimants 
must prove that government officials were biased and engaged in blatant 
discrimination.  This high threshold is rarely crossed.”76  In this case, no 
party alleged to the Court that the judges who supervised the recounts 
were motivated by discriminatory bias.77  Nonetheless, it was this 
argument that proved to be a winner for Bush.78 
Equal protection: when does it apply?  It applies when certain classes 
of people are treated unequally or when a fundamental right is violated, 
in this case the right to vote.79  But, there were many inequalities in 
Florida.80  For example, there were different machines.81  Most counties 
in Florida use optical scanners, which fail to read four in every one 
thousand votes.82  A number of other counties use punch card systems 
with a failure rate of fifteen in one thousand.83  Additionally, there are 
inequalities in how polling places are run.84  Different local officials are 
appointed to run various sites.85  No two sites are run in exactly the same 
manner.  This also results in some degree of inequality. 
There are also inequalities in ballot construction.86  We are all familiar 
with the butterfly ballot, perhaps inspired by Cook County, Illinois 
officials.87  The butterfly ballots used in Palm Beach County were 
difficult to read, as the voters there will tell you.  The voters went in 
intending to cast their vote for Al Gore and walked out having voted for 
essentially the polar opposite, Pat Buchanan.  There were and there still 
are tremendous inequalities throughout the Florida election process.88  
This case did not help to resolve these disparities.  It offered no solution 
to the disparities, other than finality in this particular case. 
What makes this inequality so important that the Court decided the 
case on it?  If the court held that the lack of consistency in counting 
ballots is a violation of equal protection, is not the lack of consistency 
 
 75. Savage & Weinstein, supra note 72, at A1. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-
949), 2000 WL 1810102; Respondent’s Opening Brief, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000) (No. 00-949), 2000 WL 1809151; Transcript of Bush v. Gore Oral Argument, 
supra note 17; see also Savage & Weinstein, supra note 72, at A1. 
 78. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
 79. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 495–784 (3d ed. 1996). 
 80. Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Responds to Values Rather than Partisanship, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at B9. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Chemerinsky, supra note 80, at B9. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 88. Id. 
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that results from different machines or different ballots also a violation 
of equal protection?89  Accepting the reasoning in Bush v. Gore leads to 
the conclusion that the entire Florida election (and maybe all elections) 
is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.90 
Ironically, the decision by this Court and the arguments advanced by 
Bush’s legal team could quickly become the basis for a number of 
Democratic and civil rights suits against punch card balloting systems.91  
If such county-by-county differences violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Constitution, then as of today, thirty-three of fifty states conduct 
their elections in an unconstitutional manner.92  A rational reading of the 
Constitution is that it allows a state to establish its own election process 
and it allows variations among the states.93  Within states themselves, the 
legislatures also allow variations from county to county.94  It seems to 
me this is reasonable, and this is rational. 
The Supreme Court raised the concern that different counties would 
be applying different standards.95  In an equal protection challenge, the 
Court should identify the class of individuals who are not being treated 
fairly.  In this case, the Court basically said that Bush is being treated 
unfairly.  This is a quote from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in the 
stay portion of the case: “The counting of votes that are of questionable 
legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner [George 
Bush], and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be 
the legitimacy of his election.”96 
In fact, Bush did not even have standing to assert equal protection 
rights of voters because Bush was not discriminated against.97  If one 
argues that he would have been discriminated against, then perhaps Bush 
still did not have standing because the case was not yet ripe.98  The 
counting was not concluded.  A better view is that because both Bush 
and Gore were held to the same standard, neither was being treated 
 
 89. Ronald Brownstein, GOP Argument Could Benefit Democrats, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2000, at A22. 
 90. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 91. Brownstein, supra note 89, at A22. 
 92. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2000). 
 96. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046–47 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
 97. Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 98. Id. 
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differently.99  Since Bush and Gore were being treated equally, who is 
the class of persons being treated unequally?  It is not clear. 
All registered Florida voters were entitled to one vote.  Ninety-seven 
percent had their vote counted, because the machine could decipher their 
ballots.100  These voters followed the directions on the ballot and the 
directions provided at each voting center.101  Only the voters whose 
votes could not be deciphered were not given the right to have their vote 
counted.  Prior to the manual recount, the class of individuals which was 
not being treated equally was the class whose votes were not counted.102  
By allowing the manual recount to continue, the number of disenfranchised 
voters would have been reduced considerably.  But, in the interest of 
finality, the majority disenfranchised an unknown number of voters 
whose ballots do reveal their intent.103 
Another problem with the Court deciding its opinion on equal 
protection grounds is that Florida law already contemplated a resolution 
to any potential inequalities.  The Florida Supreme Court remanded this, 
and any disputes among the voting ballots, to Judge Lewis.104  Any 
disagreements were to go to the circuit court where Judge Lewis, an 
impartial judge, would adjudicate all objections and concerns.  By taking 
this out of Florida’s judges’ hands, the Supreme Court shows that it did 
not trust Florida’s judges to objectively make these types of decisions.105  
Judge Lewis could have resolved any problems, but he never got the 
chance.  The Supreme Court stepped in and took this away. 
The hypocrisy of this judgment is again evidenced by the application 
of equal protection.  Until this decision, this Court had repeatedly and 
consistently turned away equal protection claims, even when confronted 
with strong allegations of racial bias.  Such was the challenge to 
Georgia’s death penalty system in 1987 when, by a five-to-four vote, the 
majority turned away the challenge.106 
The Justices who make up the majority show “remarkable indifference” 
to equal protection claims in other areas also.107  This Court routinely 
rejects equal protection cases.108  For example, the Justices refuse to hear 
cases regarding federal punishments for crack-cocaine possession.109  
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Savage & Weinstein, supra note 72, at A4. 
 107. Id.; Videotape: Tale of the Two Chads, supra note 39. 
 108. Savage & Weinstein, supra note 72, at A1, A4. 
 109. Id. at A4. 
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The Court still refuses to hear these challenges despite the fact that the 
punishment for crack-cocaine is one hundred times greater than that for 
powder cocaine.110  The Rehnquist court has also turned away equal 
protection claims from gays and lesbians who have been discharged 
from the military because of their sexual orientation.111  Apparently, the 
significant discretion that a state has in setting its own rules (tax rules, 
for example), does not apply to elections conducted in state.112  Or 
perhaps it does not apply when George Bush is on the ballot. 
Before this year, Justice Scalia has vehemently insisted that the Court 
not use the Equal Protection Clause to second-guess the states.113  
Perhaps the Scalia dissent that stands out most is from the 1996 case,  
Romer v. Evans,114 where Scalia ironically labeled the decision by the 
majority “an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will.”115  Oh, 
by the way, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined this 
dissenting opinion.116 
Specifically, Justices Scalia and Thomas, two members of the majority, 
have never before found a violation of equal protection except to shut 
down affirmative action.117  In a series of cases brought by whites challenging 
affirmative action, this Court has intervened to strike down state laws 
that benefit minorities.118  This holding for Bush is directly opposed to 
most of the majority’s jurisprudence in the equal protection arena. 
In fact, just today,119 another decision came down, five-four.  The 
Court ruled that state workers cannot use an important federal disability 
rights law to win money damages for on-the-job discrimination.120  This 
again strengthens state rights in the area of equal protection.  
Interestingly, the majority opinion again was made up of five Justices:121  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, Justice 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 653. 
 116. Id. at 636. 
 117. Savage & Weinstein, supra note 72, at A4. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Wednesday, Feb. 21, 2001. 
 120. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); see also Laurie 
Asseo, Supreme Court Limits State Workers, FEW Notes, March 15, 2001, at 6, 7, 
available at http://www.gokcfew.org/PDFs/FEWNews 02.pdf. 
 121. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 (holding that such suits violate the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
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O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy—the same Justices who comprise the 
majority in the Bush v. Gore ruling. 
Furthermore, the equal protection analysis in this case is extremely 
underdeveloped, especially when compared with most other equal 
protection cases decided by this court.122  It appears the Court was trying 
to say as little as it could to justify the opinion.  It also appears that the 
Court did this in order to limit this reverse-engineered decision to the 
facts of this case. 
Even if you do buy the Court’s application of equal protection in this 
context, the Court’s remedy avoids the issue.  What the Court did upon 
finding this equal protection violation was first, to express concern about 
protecting the class of voters whose ballots were not read by the 
machine, and then, the majority invoked federal constitutional principles 
to ensure that all those ballots would be ignored.123  This is contrary to 
the Court’s usual resolution in equal protection cases.  Normally the 
Court will purge the inequality.  Instead, the Court threw up its hands 
and said: “This is just too hard.  We just do not have the time.  We just 
do not have the time to correctly determine the winner of the presidential 
election.”  What kind of a solution is that? 
The application of the Equal Protection Clause, without providing a 
remedy, simply is an inadequate justification to overrule a state supreme 
court’s interpretation of its own law.  Equality legitimately could have 
been achieved by allowing Florida to continue the recounting until 
December 18th, along with the establishment of uniform standards.124  
Or, at the very least, the Court could have sent the case back to the 
Florida Supreme Court and let it establish uniform standards for Florida.125  
The majority—the champions and defenders of state sovereignty—
traded in their federalist principles when it was convenient.126  This is 
troubling. 
Bush v. Gore could turn out to be a one-time-only excursion, which 
will result in great criticism of this Court.  Or, it could also affect a range 
of future cases, especially in the area of federalism.  However, as is 
indicated by today’s ruling, this is unlikely.  Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence briefly addresses this, but it remains to be seen whether this 
will be enough of an explanation for critics. 
Nevertheless, it is precedent and this Court has likely not seen the last 
of this decision.127  The principle of this case is so large that it could 
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involve and prompt legal challenges to all elections, even those with a 
much larger margin of victory than the very narrow margin in Florida.128  
In the inevitable future election cases, and in the future equal protection 
cases, it will be difficult for this Court to distinguish this case in a 
principled manner.129 
In reality, the Supreme Court probably believed it was sparing the 
country further division, and it was willing to take the hit.130  The 
majority’s theory was not the most rational, not the most well developed, 
nor the most well thought.  But it was expedient and it put an end to our 
potential constitutional crisis.131  However, the next time the Court 
ignores an equal protection argument, or fails to find a violation, then we 
will understand just how profound this decision is.  Thank you. 
III.  OPEN FLOOR DISCUSSION 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
I would like to exercise the moderator’s prerogative by asking the first 
question, and it goes back to the procedural context.  I served on the 
federal court for almost twenty years.  In granting an injunction, we were 
required to make a finding of irreparable injury.  Irreparable injury 
requires a conclusion that something had to be done before the final 
hearing.  And the first question that I would have is: What was the 
irreparable injury that required the Supreme Court to enjoin the manual 
counting?   
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
First, let me make it clear that the stay was issued against a manual 
recount that was not in accord with constitutional requirements per seven 
Justices of the Court.  So whatever would have had to happen, you 
would have had to start over from point one on the recount even if the 
U.S. Supreme Court had remanded to the Florida Supreme Court to 
direct a recount using uniform standards. 
And let me parenthetically note that it seems like the only difference 
that there is between our side and the other side is whether the U.S. 
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Supreme Court should have remanded to start over with a new recount.  
I did not hear anybody on the other side defend either the recount as it 
was progressing under the direction of the Florida Supreme Court, or the 
selective recount as pressed for by Gore’s lawyers.  So the only thing we 
are debating is whether they should have remanded it to start over. 
Now, the question that you ask is: “What is the harm of having a 
constitutionally defective recount going forward in parallel with a 
Supreme Court hearing that will ultimately conclude that it is defective 
and direct that it start over?”  (Because the Court had to conclude that 
there was irreparable injury, in addition to a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits.) 
I do not think this is a real clear cut case, but if you had a recount, 
even an admittedly constitutionally defective recount, that showed Gore 
the winner and purported to be conclusive, I do think that would further 
undermine the legitimacy of Bush’s ultimate election.  If I were in a race 
and I thought that there was a count going forward that was 
unconstitutional, and even if I was confident that it would ultimately be 
overturned, I think I would prefer to have it stopped in the middle rather 
than have it actually produce a result.  So I guess the harm is the fact of a 
result which is unconstitutional, but is nonetheless there. 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
The U.S. Supreme Court took the position that the Florida Supreme 
Court should have ordered the recounts to continue with standards.  
Wasn’t that what they were concerned about—the lack of standards in 
determining the intent? 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
Right, that was the seven to two piece. 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
Well, wouldn’t the Supreme Court then have said that if the Florida 
court ordered the recount with standards that the Florida court was 
making new law? 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
Yes, I think that is somewhat problematic.  I think that is what is 
wrapped up in this whole case.  To have a recount that is not in 
accordance with what the legislature has directed runs afoul of not only 
the time—the December 12th safe harbor—but also of the other safe 
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harbor which is that you cannot make new rules after the fact.  So yes, I 
think that would have been problematic on that ground as well. 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
Any view from the opposing side about irreparable injury? 
ERIN ALEXANDER: 
Brian Fogarty noted in his discussion that the class of person harmed 
and the irreparable injury on both counts, is for George Bush’s harm and 
injury.  So we see irony in that irreparable injury caused to three percent 
of Florida votes not counted is weighed much less by the Supreme Court 
than the irreparable injury that might have been caused to Bush. 
BRIAN FOGARTY: 
I think that the class of voters—the class of people protected—is still 
Bush.  And I think that is problematic when you decide the case on equal 
protection grounds. 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
And what about the argument that no election in the past or future can 
possibly survive this standard that has been enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in this decision on equal protection grounds? 
JOSHUA JESSEN: 
I think, as a practical matter, that the Court limited its holding to the 
facts of this case.  I do think that if, in the future, a state attempts to have 
a statewide recount and does not use something closer to a concrete 
standard, the recount might encounter equal protection problems.  I do 
not think that is a bad thing.  Henceforth, the thirty-three states that have 
the “intent of the voter” standard must realize that it may not pass 
constitutional muster in these types of situations. 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
If I could quickly speak to the scope of this thing.  The way I read this 
opinion, all they are saying is that if you are going to treat ballots 
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differently you have to have a decent reason for doing it that way.  I 
think that most differential treatments will probably survive that 
standard.  The problem in this case was that there just was not any 
explanation for why you would count an identically marked ballot as a 
vote in Broward County and as a nonvote in Palm Beach County.  The 
response to the question, “Why are you treating me differently?”—to the 
extent there was a response—was simply incoherent.  It was, “Well, they 
decided to do it differently.”  That is not a sufficient reason. 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
Was the standard on its face unconstitutional as opposed to how it was 
actually applied?   
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
No, I do not think the standard on its face is unconstitutional.  But the 
problem is when you have different ways of doing it that do not make 
any sense.  Suppose you had a rule that said in Broward County if there 
are any blue pen marks, we will call it a Bush vote, but in Palm Beach 
County their rule was if there are blue marks on it, we will call that a 
Gore vote.  What was going on was just made up arbitrarily.  I think that 
was the problem. 
When you talk about other things like optical scanners versus the 
punch cards, optical scanners are a lot more expensive.  Some counties 
do not have the resources to buy them.  I think that is a reasonable 
reason for having optical scanners in one place and punch cards in 
another.  There may be some other tradeoffs.  I am not an expert in the 
field of voting machines.  There may be other relative advantages that 
can be explained in this fashion.  This is basic equal protection law.  The 
state needs to come forward with some explanation for why it is treating 
identically situated things differently.  That is fundamental.  And here 
there simply was no explanation.  I think when you have an explanation, 
it is going to go the other way. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: 
I do not understand the difference between interpreting the law and 
making new law.  I mean, the Supreme Court said in 1966 that there have to 
be certain standards before you can get a confession into evidence.132 
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PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
That is an example of making law. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: 
Why is it not interpreting the Fifth Amendment?  It seems to me that 
every time your side loses, you complain that the Supreme Court made 
new law.  What is the difference between new law and interpretation that 
you do not like? 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
I think that is actually quite a fair point.  I will take the comment to 
mean not every time my side loses, but every time one side loses.  The 
“making new law” argument was not, of course, the basis of the opinion.  
That is simply the basis of the concurrence.  They only got three votes 
for that.  So to the extent that you are persuaded by the equal protection 
violation, which is what the majority of the Court found, there is no need 
to worry about the “making new law” claim.  The equal protection 
violation has nothing to do with interpreting the Florida law.  It is 
entirely a federal question. 
On the “making new law” argument, I think that it is very difficult to 
say when a court has gone so far beyond the boundaries of the statutory 
text it is supposed to be reading that its interpretation has become 
illegitimate.  I think there are times when that is the case, and it is just a 
question whether this was one of those or not.  One thing the concurrence 
pointed out was that, in light of the Constitution’s special direction, this 
was supposed to be a legislative determination; the Florida Supreme 
Court should have proceeded with special deference to the commands of 
the Florida legislature.  And the concurrence found the Florida court had 
not done that.   
To directly answer your question,  I think that in some cases a court is 
clearly outside the bounds of the statute and in other cases a court is 
working within the bounds of the statute but stretching them a little bit.  
It is a close question in this case on which side the Florida court fell. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: 
I was hoping that we would get a response to the assertion that this in 
fact was a partisan decision.  Professor Ramsey sort of somewhat skirted 
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that earlier.  But what is the position on this side about what appears to 
be on its face a rather remarkable foray into the area of what would be 
states’ rights in previous renderings of this Court?  Are you saying it is 
not a partisan decision?   
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
Yes, I am saying that it is not a partisan decision in the sense that it is 
Republicans versus Democrats.  I say that if this had come up in a 
different context four weeks earlier with Gore asking for a statewide 
recount based on uniform standards, then Gore wins.  I think he might 
win nine to zero.  I do not think it was partisan in that sense.  I think 
what happened was that Gore ended up in an unsympathetic position.  
And as a result, the people who were least likely to be sympathetic to 
him anyway ended up on the other side. 
So again, as I said in the opening presentation, I am not sure whether 
that means that I think it is political or not, but I think that what it means 
is that you do not want to come before judges that may be a little bit 
hostile to you to begin with, with a case that is frankly unsympathetic.  
So that is the substance of my view of it.  I will let my colleague speak 
to the merits of the legal arguments.  I think the legal arguments are 
strong on both sides.  I do not think either side has a slam-dunk. 
BRIAN FOGARTY: 
I think you cannot underestimate the fact that even if this was not a 
purely political opinion, and I am not asserting that it was a purely 
political opinion, the majority of people who look at this are going to say 
these are five people, five Justices, who constantly defend states’ rights.  
And they switched gears here. They said no, we are going to tell the state 
how to run its own election.  That is how the majority proceeded, and 
that is where the political part of it comes in, because it looks like not 
just five people who were less sympathetic to the less reasonable side, 
but five Justices who went from drive to reverse on states’ rights in one 
case.  And now we have the first evidence that it will not be the trend.  I 
think that is why this decision will lead to increasing political debate 
about whether this was a political decision. 
Do I personally believe it was?  No.  A few days after the opinion, Justice 
Thomas made a public appearance to answer high school students’ 
questions about the Supreme Court.133  One student asked him if he 
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thought he would have to answer a lot of questions about whether 
irreparably deep divisions would be one result of this opinion.  He 
responded that he does not believe this will be a problem: “In nine-plus 
years here . . . I have never heard the first unkind word.”134  But in 
writing the opinion, they constantly felt as if they were looking over 
their shoulders saying, how is this going to look?135  I think that was 
ultimately what came out of it.  A lot of people questioned, how does 
this look, along with the Justices.  Yes, the Justices make up the 
Supreme Court, but they too are human. 
ERIN ALEXANDER: 
It is not only on the issue of states’ rights, but also on the equal 
protection grounds, which as Joshua Jessen pointed out is the majority’s 
argument.  These are the same five Justices, most notably Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, who almost always and consistently 
have turned away equal protection arguments.  Yet, in this case, they did 
not do so. 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
Can I make a couple of points regarding the alleged inconsistency 
between past decisions and this one?  I think there is an element of ad 
hominem attacks on the Justices going on here.  I am not sure it is 
entirely legitimate.  Let me make two points. 
First, on the states’ rights point, it is not clear to me that it is states’ 
rights on one side versus no states’ rights on the other.  The question is, 
what is the state?  What part of the state is being defended?  As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his concurrence, the state was not of a 
single mind here.  In fact, the legislative branch and executive branch of 
the State of Florida felt (and you may draw your own conclusion as to 
why they felt this way) that the initial count of votes was the correct one.  
The judicial branch of the state of Florida was on the other side.  What 
was going on here was you had an internal debate within the state as to 
what was the appropriate interpretation of state law.  So to say that the 
U.S. Supreme Court overturned the state’s view of what its law was, is 
to attribute a monolithicity to the state that simply does not exist.  I think 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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it is just wrong to see this as an opposition to states’ rights.  That just 
does not follow. 
On the equal protection point, it is somewhat true that some of these 
Justices have been hostile to some equal protection claims in the past.  
But it is not the case that all of these Justices have generally opposed 
equal protection claims and it is not true that any of these Justices have 
always opposed equal protection claims.  And, indeed, Brian Fogarty 
slipped in there the fact that, for example, these Justices have been very 
strong on defending equal protection rights in affirmative action cases.  
Now you may think those cases are wrong, but that does not mean that 
these Justices are not defending equal protection rights.  It just means 
that they are defending the equal protection rights of people you do not 
happen to sympathize with.  That does not mean they are hypocritical.  It 
just means they have a different conception of the Equal Protection 
Clause than you do. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: 
I thought the basis of the argument was that the strategy was wrong on 
Gore’s side because, out of the gates, they were pushing for a selective 
recount with regard to the Democratic counties.  However, it is my 
understanding that the initial request of Gore’s side was to have a 
recount of all the state’s Republican and Democratic-controlled counties.  
That initial request was denied by the powers-that-be in the Florida 
government.  Only after that denial did they say that, at a minimum, they 
wanted the other votes counted in those heavily Democratic counties.  If 
that is true, that is kind of a Catch-22 position because you are saying 
that you cannot have the whole state but you are wrong because you 
only want these counties.  It seems like there is no circumstance under 
those facts where they could make a request that would be reasonable in 
the eyes of the Republican-controlled Florida government. 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
I think that is a fair point if true.  I am not aware of whether that is true 
or not. 
BRIAN FOGARTY: 
Speaking for Gore’s side, that is not true.  Gore asked for the four 
counties to be recounted and then tossed it over to Bush136 publicly and 
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said: “If you want a state recount, go ahead and request it.” 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
I think what Gore did do as a political matter was he said that he 
would drop his lawsuits and his requests for recounts if Bush would 
agree to a statewide recount.  But that was a proposal made in a political 
forum, and it is unclear whether, as a legal matter, he was really 
prepared to follow through on it.  My focus in my remarks was very 
much on the legal strategy, and my impression of the legal strategy was 
that it was always focused on getting the selected recount. 
I guess I would add that even if it is true that the statewide recount 
was initially denied by the State of Florida, it seems Gore certainly could 
have appealed that through the Florida court system, which he certainly 
did not do.  Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court did decide the statewide 
recount was the right answer.  If Gore had somehow managed to get that 
rule out of the Florida Supreme Court four weeks earlier than he did, I 
think he would have won. 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
Professor, they certainly had the right to select the counties with 
which they wished to make a contest, did they not? 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court said no, although there were 
technical arguments why they should have.  The Florida Supreme Court 
ultimately said that it had to be a statewide recount for equal protection 
reasons.  But my point really is not so much the legalities of it because I 
think that confuses your technical legal rights with your reasonableness.  
My emphasis really is that you need to have an eye to your reasonableness, 
not just to what is arguable legally. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: 
One problem I have had with all of this, from what I understand of the 
argument is that the holding is based on equal protection.  There is a lot 
of talk of constitutional crisis and constitutional nightmare, but it seems 
 
after the election did the former vice president propose a statewide recount.”). 
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like what you are really talking about is, if it had gone to Congress, it is 
really a constitutional process.  My question is: by inserting themselves 
into this, did the Supreme Court really short circuit the process? 
ERIN ALEXANDER: 
We would agree with that. There was a mechanism set up in Florida 
law to deal with any equal protection type problems.  In fact, Florida 
election law stated that once the manual recount was to go forward, 
protests should go to the circuit judge, in this case Judge Lewis, to 
resolve any controversies.  And that process was not allowed to take 
place because the Supreme Court stepped in. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: 
I think more specifically of the U.S. Constitution and the provisions in 
it for disputes of electors to go into the U.S. Congress.137  By forestalling 
that process, they really insert themselves where they do not belong. 
BRIAN FOGARTY: 
I agree with you.  The Court did insert itself where it did not belong, 
but I think that most observers would agree that if this election dispute 
had to go through its entire process, even though it is probably not fair to 
call it a constitutional crisis (more of a constitutional process as you 
would like to label it), it would still be viewed by most observers as a 
constitutional crisis.  We are testing waters that we have never tested 
before.  I think that is where the label came from.  I think the label was 
also very media driven.  I think that most constitutional law professors 
would have a good time teaching the process if it had gone through and 
run the whole process. 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL RAMSEY: 
I was just going to say that it is not entirely clear to me what the 
process is.  It  is not in the Constitution.  It is a matter of federal statute 
how this is all resolved.  It is the federal statute that was passed after the 
Hayes-Tilden debacle in 1876.138  They ultimately had to appoint a 
commission to decide the Hayes-Tilden matter, and then tried to pass a 
 
 137. The student seems to be referring to the state power to appoint delegates to the 
electoral college granted under Article II, Section 1.  See Georgene M. Vairo, Forum 
Selection: Bush v. Gore, 23 NAT. L.J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A16. 
 138. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 15  (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Act of 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 
373 (1887). 
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statute that would take care of similar things in the future.  But, I must 
say that I have read that statute and it is very opaque.  In particular, it is 
difficult to figure out what would happen if two sets of electors are 
presented, and the houses of Congress are divided as to which slate of 
electors is the appropriate one.  There is a default provision, but I am not 
sure if the default provision actually would have answered the question 
in this particular case.  I think it is a little bit too easy to say that 
Congress would have just figured it out.  But it is also a fair point to say, 
“Maybe we should have let this work out and see where it went.” 
JOSHUA JESSEN: 
The biggest problem is how long it would have taken Congress to sort 
this out.  As an aside, it is somewhat interesting how Americans look to 
the Supreme Court for the final word.  Americans look to the Court on 
issues like abortion and civil rights.  It would have been interesting to 
see how Americans would have reacted to the idea that Congress could 
actually sort this out on its own. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: 
There seems to be a concern that there are different standards in the 
recount of hanging chads and things of that sort, but there are different 
standards in that there are different ballots, choice of ballots, punch 
cards or whatever the case may be, and there are different standards 
across the board and across states.  Why would that not be an equal 
protection violation? 
JOSHUA JESSEN: 
With respect to equal protection, you are not going to have a problem 
interstate because equal protection is dealing with intrastate matters—
the state treating its citizens differently within the state.  That said, I 
think the bottom line is, as Professor Ramsey pointed out, in order to 
avoid an equal protection violation, the one thing you must have (and 
there are various levels of scrutiny) is, at a minimum, a legitimate state 
interest.  In this case, as Justice Souter said, there is no conceivable 
legitimate interest for the state to allow the counties to count these 
ballots differently.  I think the argument for why this is not going to 
open a Pandora’s box with respect to all elections violating equal 
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protection (due to, for example, different types of voting machines) is, as 
Professor Ramsey noted, the fact that legitimate governmental interests, 
such as cost, may justify differences. 
As a political matter, I think these differences are something we 
should try to remedy.  I think we should, in the interest of having the 
fairest elections, try to make those uniform.  There is no question that, in 
reality, if you are in a lower socioeconomic area, there is a greater 
chance your vote is not going to be counted.  I think that is a problem.  It 
is not necessarily an equal protection violation, but it is something the 
political process should address. 
HONORABLE H. LEE SAROKIN: 
I want to thank Professor Ramsey and the student participants for 
enlightening us all.   
 
